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Abstract: 
The advent of resilience strategies in the field of emergency planning and response has been 
premised on a profound re-evaluation of the referents of security governance.  Together, the 
discovery of the ‘myth’ of panic and the natural resilience of populations has encouraged the 
spread of resilience strategies which aim to promote the adaptive and self-organizational 
capacities of populations in emergency.  This chapter seeks to advance an alternative to this 
positivist explanation: that the appearance of ‘resilient populations’ is the correlate of a broader 
restructuring of rationalities and practices comprising liberal governance. Tracing the evolution 
of the figure of the natural underpinning liberal governmentalities through the historical 
development of Ecology and Economics, this chapter looks to make explicit the epistemological 
order supportive of neoliberal governance. In doing so, this chapter identifies the historical 
conditions of possibility for ‘resilient populations’ to emerge as a referent of governance.
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Introduction 
 
Panic has long figured as a principle consideration guiding strategies of emergency 
governance.  Its spectacular fall from a core operational assumption organizing 
emergency response well into the final days of the Cold War to its current status within 
academic literatures as ‘myth’ (Clarke 2002; Cocking et al. 2009; Johnson 1985; 
Keating 1982; Sheppard et al. 2006; Tierney 2003; Wessely 2005) must therefore be 
regarded as a pivotal event in the history of emergency governance. 
In stark contrast to the competitive, self-interested behaviour assumed to 
accompany emergencies, disaster researchers have documented the widespread 
cooperation—even altruism—which often manifests during disasters. Social norms, far 
from breaking down, not only continued to govern behaviour (Cocking et al. 2009; 
Sime 1983; Drury et al. 2009) but proved remarkably resilient with incidences of 
violence and crime often subsiding significantly (Auf der Heide 2004; Tierney 2003).  
To the extent that ‘irrational behaviour’, or panic, was witnessed, experts argued that 
these were in fact rational decisions based on imperfect knowledge within a rapidly 
unfolding event, which only appeared to onlookers as irrational (Tierney 2003).  Panic, 
we are now told, is nothing more than a fallacious, culturally ingrained belief, 
perpetuated through its ubiquitous appearance in media portrayals of emergencies, but 
having no basis in reality (Clarke 2002; Tierney 2003).  Disaster researchers have also 
noted the implications of this research on the organization, direction, and conduct of 
emergency response (Dynes & Drabek 1994; Manyena 2006).  Government, within an 
unfolding emergency, should not look to direct, but to supplement and encourage the 
natural tendencies of those in emergency events to help themselves. Instead of 
withholding information, for fear of inciting panic, populations in emergency should be 
provided with all the information they require to self-organize an evacuation or response 
(Proulx & Sime 1991).   People are to be encouraged, not directed; managed, not 
controlled.   
The acknowledgement that panic is a ‘myth’ has lent support to the profound 
reorganization of UK emergency governance at the turn of the century.  Departing 
radically from the disciplinary logic which guided British Civil Defence over the course 
of the Cold War, the resilience strategies of UK Civil Contingencies are instead oriented 
towards facilitating and optimizing the natural, self-organizational capacities, or 
‘resilience’, of populations-in-emergency  (Zebrowski 2009; Kaufmann 2013). The 
advent of resilience strategies within UK Civil Contingencies has thus been explained as 
the result of an improved conceptualization of the referents of security.  But disaster 
research also serves to legitimise resilience strategies by premising the introduction of 
these policies on an empirically validated re-evaluation of collective human behaviour 
within emergency events.  Indeed, resilience strategies are routinely celebrated as 
demonstrative of the growing humanism of emergency governance. Within these 
narratives, resilience enjoins the positivism of social science with the emancipatory 
project of liberalism: Knowledge of the nature of ‘the social’ permits less governance, 
less control and more ‘freedom’.   
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This chapter seeks to advance an alternative to this positivist explanation: that 
the appearance of ‘resilient populations’ is an effect, rather the cause, of a broader 
restructuring of rationalities and practices comprising liberal governance.  Such an 
explanation challenges the idea that resilience represents an objective ‘discovery’ of 
(social) science.  Instead, resilient populations are taken to be a particular enframing of 
life forged and sustained through the repeated exercise of practices governance.  Such 
an approach entails placing a priority on the constitutive effect of practices in shaping 
our understanding of the world around us.  Moreover, it draws attention to the 
ontopolitical status of resilient populations as a referent of governance.  To say that 
resilience is the correlate of neoliberalism does not mean that resilient populations are 
an illusion or a ‘false’ conception.  On the contrary, such a claim invities critical inquiry 
into the processes through which resilient populations were rendered ‘true’, panic was 
deemed ‘false’, and the implications of this shift for the ways in which governmental 
power is exercised during emergencies. 
This chapter aims to identify the conditions under which resilient populations 
could emerge as a referent of emergency governance.  It does so by investigating 
transformations in the order of power/knowledge underpinning liberal governance.  Our 
analysis begins by recognizing the importance which the ‘natural’ status of the market 
played in the historical genesis of liberalism as an art of governance.  As disciplines 
with an authority on the composition of ‘the natural’, the historical co-evolution of 
Economics and Ecology is quickly traced with the aim of rendering explicit their 
common archaeological structure.  Emphasis is placed on the function of equilibrium-
based models (which persisted from classical studies of balance to the cybernetically-
inflected discourses dominant in the period following the Second World War) in 
providing nature a telos and liberal governance an objective.  C.S. Holling’s resilience 
theory is next examined as a radical departure from classical equilibrium based models 
towards an atelic figure of nature composed of multiple, emergent equilibria.  The 
simultaneous rearticulation of Ecology and Economics within the framework of the 
complexity sciences is taken as a profound shift in the order of ‘the natural’ enabling the 
development of novel forms of government.  Turning to Hayek’s appropriation of the 
complexity discourses in his later career, this study looks to identify the historical 
singularity of ‘environmental’ techniques of exercising power.  Taken together, this 
novel account of nature coupled with environmental techniques of government is 
understood to forge a new regime of knowledge/power.  The final section of this chapter 
accounts for the appearance of resilient populations as function of the emergence of this 
regime. 
 
The nature of Nature 
 
Before the term oecology was coined by German Darwinist Ernst Haeckel in 1866, 
references to the study of ‘nature’s economy’ abounded.  The phrase derived from 
Linnaeus’ 1749 The Oeconomy of Nature: a study of the divine order visible within 
nature’s design.  In the late eighteenth century the term oeconomy still carried a 
connotation with household management—the original sense of the term from which it 
derives the prefix oikos, Greek for home or habitation.  Thus, the title of Linnaeus’ 
highly influential 1749 The Oeconomy of Nature referred to the transcendent Creator’s 
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orderly design of nature rather than an allusion to ‘political economy’ in the 
contemporary sense.  Early studies of nature’s economy marvelled at the balance and 
harmony achieved by this divine design which paired ends with means down to the 
infinitely small detail (Worster 1994).  Yet, while God’s infinite attention to detail was a 
source of marvel, it provided a problem for translating nature into a model for human 
governance.  While man could aspire to this level of management, it was only God, with 
his infinite wisdom, who could achieve such perfection in design.   
Ecology,1 which emerged as a field of study at the threshold of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was to purge the idea of a transcendent 
ordering of nature by a divine Creator and replace it with a model of immanent self-
ordering through competition. As is well known, Darwin credited Thomas Malthus for 
insights leading him to the theory of natural selection, which echoed economic notions 
of the invisible hand as a mechanism responsible for the immanent self-ordering of the 
market.  However, the success of classical economic liberalism was similarly based on 
its success in articulating market mechanisms as ‘natural’.  In his lecture series The 
Birth of Biopolitics Foucault discusses how from the middle of the eighteenth century 
the market transitions from a site of jurisdiction against fraud—a significant risk 
between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—to a site of veridiction: ‘a site and a 
mechanism for the formation of truth’ (Foucault 2008, 30).   Integral to this shift, 
Foucault argues, was the ‘discovery’ of the market’s ability, when left to its own 
devices, to generate a ‘natural price’: one which accurately represents the relation 
between costs of production and demand.  The ‘natural’ status of the market was used to 
argue for the displacement of government intervention from ensuring justice within the 
market to limiting interference (and especially political interference) with these ‘natural’ 
mechanisms. 
While references to ordered harmony faded as both fields became similarly 
conceptualized as sites of competition for scarce resources, the emphasis on balance 
would be preserved and given ‘scientific’ rigour within studies of market equilibrium.  
In his 1874 Elements of a Pure Economics Léon Walras provided the foundations for 
general equilibrium theory by outlining the basic equations for a general equilibrium 
model and advanced a proof for the existence of a solution (Walras 2003, 169).  
Moreover, Walras sought to specify how this solution would be arrived at through the 
‘natural’ adjustment mechanisms which exist within a competitive market.  Competitive 
markets arrived at equilibrium prices—those which perfectly coordinate aggregate 
demand with supply so as to clear the market—through a process of tâtonnement 
(‘groping towards’) (Walras 2003, 170).  If prices were set under equilibrium levels, so 
as to render supply insufficient for demand, then prices would slowly climb as markets 
‘groped towards’ equilibrium level, and vice versa.  Through a process of ‘sequential’ 
tâtonnement markets would clear, one at a time, until prices converged at a general 
equilibrium.  Likewise, destabilization of prices following an economic shock would be 
expected to adjust through tâtonnement back to equilibrium over time. 
The natural tendency towards equilibrium was echoed at this time within 
ecological treatments of succession.  By the turn of the twentieth century, ecology had 
become a prominent field, in large part due to its perceived insight into the integration 
of political and economic units which were used to inform strategies of social, and 
                                                          
1 In 1893 it was decided by the International Botanical Congress to change the name of the field to our 
modern spelling ‘ecology’ (Worster, 1994) 
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especially colonial, administration (Anker 2001).  It is not unsurprising then, that a 
primary area of study was ecological succession: the colonization of plant and animal 
communities within a given region over time.  Succession was premised on the 
widespread assumption of progressive development of a biotic community, consisting 
of both animal and vegetal species.  Of particular influence to the field were Fredric 
Clements’ theories of succession—widely suspected of having been derived from his 
reading of sociologist, and social Darwinist, Herbert Spencer (Worster 1994; Anker 
2001; Kwa 2002).  Biotic communities were thought to progress from a relatively 
homogenous and undifferentiated community (in human terms: a hunter-gatherer 
society) to more heterogeneous ‘complex’ communities in which functions were 
harmonized into a functioning whole (modern European societies)—which for 
Clements, as for Spencer, functioned as a ‘super-organism’.  Increased harmonization of 
the whole would absolve the need for further adaptation, thus halting evolution at what 
Clements would term a climax community.  A climax community refers to the 
ecological composition of this biotic (or human) community within the final stage in its 
development.   The type of vegetation composing the climax stage—be it a forest, 
desert, marsh, grassland, or otherwise—was said to be predefined by regional climatic 
variables such as temperature, rainfall and wind. While external shocks to an ecological 
community could disrupt this progression, nature would always rebound to continue its 
march through intermediary stages, known as seres, towards its climatically defined 
climax.   
  In 1935 Arthur Tansley outlined an inventory of systems based on the value of 
‘stability’ (Tansley 1935).  Stability was measured by the ability of a system to maintain 
its composure over time.  The ‘ecosystem’, a term appearing for the first time in this 
paper in distinction to the ‘biotic communities’ and ‘complex organisms’ found in the 
holistic theories of Clements and Smuts, was a relatively unstable system given the 
range of factors both internal and external which could disrupt equilibrium.  Yet the 
natural return of the system to equilibrium was assumed almost without question.  “The 
universal tendency to the evolution of dynamic equilibria has long been recognized” and 
thus was provided no further explanation within the paper (Tansley 1935).  Kwa has 
suggested that this self-evidence may be related to the widespread reference in 
explanations of life processes at the turn of the century to Le Chatelier's late nineteenth 
century experiments which demonstrated that endogenous shocks to a chemical 
equilibrium would be responded to by other factors so as to restore equilibrium (Kwa 
2002, 33). 
The scientification of ecology at this time was mirrored within the fields of 
economics.  From the 1930’s, Walrasian microeconomics would become more 
rigorously mathematicized as part of an overall trend in economics (Mirowski 2002, 7; 
Weintraub 2002).  In the process, core concepts such as equilibrium, stability and the 
process of tâtonnement would be fundamentally reinterpreted (Weintraub 2002, 125).  
Tâtonnement would be rearticulated during this time to make it amenable to the 
ascendant neoclassical synthesis of Walrasian (microeconomic) theory and Keynesian 
(macroeconomic) theory, which effectively displaced a number of rival theories 
including Institutionalist, Marxist, and Austrian perspectives during this period (Hands 
2009).  Walrasian sequential tâtonnement would be replaced within the literature by 
Samuelson’s version of tâtonnement which foregrounded speed of adjustment and more 
adequately accommodated Keynesian concerns regarding the ‘stickiness’ of some 
markets in adjusting to equilibrium including especially, labour markets.  Keynesian 
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demand-management could thus be justified in assisting processes of tâtonnement to 
restore equilibrium in a more efficient and timely manner. 
The common archaeological structure of the fields of ecology and economics 
from the time of their co-constitution was premised on a ‘natural’ telos towards a unique 
equilibrium following a systemic perturbation.  The stability of systems to withstand 
shock—to move only incrementally away from equilibrium and return to it quickly 
thereafter—was recognized as a value with which to assess these systems and inform 
programmes of governance.    The diagram of governance operating in relation to this 
ontologization of nature would operate a security logic of protection designed to protect 
systems from shocks in the first place and speed their return to equilibrium following a 
perturbation.  This is what Holling would call ‘engineering resilience’ (Holling 1996), 
the security programme advocated by systems ecologists concerned with speedily 
restoring a presumed ‘natural’ equilibrium.  It was in opposition to both this logic of 
security that Holling would advance the notion of ‘ecological resilience’: a programme 
of governance which not only reinterpreted the telos of security, but offered a radical re-
ontologization of nature rooted within the discourses of the complexity sciences. 
 
Transforming Nature 
 
In the 1950’s Clements’ theory of a climax community would be refigured, but 
essentially preserved, as functional homeostasis when ecology was translated into the 
discourse of cybernetics.  The ecosystem, understood as a cybernetic system, responded 
to destabilizing exogenous shocks through feedback mechanisms which would return 
the system to a pre-defined equilibrium state.  Written in response to these models C.S. 
Hollings’ highly influential Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems would 
challenge the notion that nature was itself organized around a unique ‘natural’ 
equilibrium and, with it, challenge the long established belief in nature’s telos (Holling 
1973).  In doing so, Holling would draw on developments in third-wave cybernetics 
associated with chaos, complexity and self-organizing autopoietic systems in order to 
advance a security programme for ecosystemic sustainability which he would term 
‘resilience.’  
Specifically, Holling took issue with the cybernetically-grounded ‘systems 
ecology’ of brothers Eugene and Howard (Tom) Odum.  Inspired by the writings of 
Alfred Lotka on the energetics of evolution, the brothers’ work used systems analysis to 
study the function of energy flows within a system (Odum 1953; Patten & Odum 1981; 
Odum 1983).  In the process, Tansley’s notion of ecosystem would be reconceptualised 
as a cybernetic system progressively developing towards a climax-state of ‘functional 
homeostasis’.  In The Strategy of Ecosystem Development the idea of functional 
homeostasis is presented as both nature’s telos and a security project: “In a word, the 
“strategy” of succession as a short-term process is basically the same as the “strategy” 
of long-term evolutionary development of the biosphere—namely, increased control of, 
or homeostasis with, the physical environment in the sense of achieving maximum 
protection from its perturbations” (Odum 1969, 262).   Achieving “maximum 
protection”, it is noted, may however conflict with man’s emphasis on “maximum 
production”—an idea that is given further development by Eugene’s brother Howard in 
Environment, Power and Society (Odum 1971).  Here, H. T. Odum reflected on the 
6 
 
implications of industrial-led growth for the sustainability of Western eco-systems, 
arguing that the depletion of fossil-based resources would demand a fundamental 
restructuring of economies along sustainable lines.  Achieving such a programme would 
require a massive effort in the control engineering of economies with an eye to the 
natural limits of ecosystems (Cooper & Walker 2011, 6).   
Holling’s work would challenge the command and control approaches to 
ecosystem management advocated by systems ecologists, in favour of what he would 
term a resilience approach.  Earliest mention of the concept appeared within Resilience 
and stability of ecological systems (Holling 1973).  The paper immediately takes aim at 
quantitative approaches to ecosystem management, stating that the application of 
systems analysis to the study of ecosystems places an excessive emphasis on 
equilibrium which “may simply reflect an analytic approach developed in one area 
because it was useful and then transferred to another where it may not be” (Holling 
1973, 1).  Instead, questions of sustainability require a shift in “emphasis from the 
equilibrium states to the conditions for persistence” (Holling 1973, 2). 
Over the course of the article, Holling progressively outlines a new ontology of 
ecosystems rooted in the discourse of complex adaptive systems.  Critically, Holling 
dismisses the idea that ecosystems organize around a single equilibrium point to which 
a system will automatically return following systemic shock.  Rather, the particular 
attractor around which a system is organized represents only one of a multitude of 
possible states, which emerge and disappear over time.  A system will continue to 
organize around a particular attractor given the presence of feedback mechanisms 
related to levels of biodiversity.  The range in which a system can operate whilst 
organizing around the same attractor is referred to as a stability domain.  Stability 
domains themselves evolve over time, expanding or contracting based on the size and 
number of these feedback loops operating around an attractor.  The gradual weakening 
of the feedback loops operating around an attractor, for example through the loss of 
biodiversity within an ecosystem, can make a system more fragile and susceptible to 
shocks that will transfer it out of its current stability domain, towards an attractor 
organised around different processes.  Depending on the nature of the feedback cycles 
within a regime, a transition may either be gradual or sudden—which accounts for the 
non-linear phase shifts of a system over time. 
Holling was eager to emphasize the implications of this new ontology of nature 
for ecosystem management.  He criticized efforts to protect vulnerable populations 
through system stabilizing approaches focused on maintaining the system in an 
equilibrium state.  Programmes based on maintaining an optimal level of a population, 
such as those of Maximum Sustained Yield or protectionist policies designed to 
eliminate competitors and predators, have had, in some documented cases, the 
unintended consequences of reducing the overall resilience of a system: “a measure of 
the persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still 
maintain the same relationships between populations or state variables” (Holling 1973, 
14).  Eroding the resilience of a system would leave it more susceptible to even minor 
external perturbations—random events such as climactic change, fire or pollution—
which could flip the system into another stability domain and potentially increase the 
risk of wholesale species extinction (Holling 1973, 9).  According to Holling, for 
ecosystem management “the important point is not so much how stable they are within 
the domain, but how likely it is for the system to move from one domain into another 
and so persist in a changed configuration” (Holling 1973, 10). Going further, Holling 
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suggested that in many cases what appears to be an instability within a system, such as 
widely fluctuating population levels of a particular species, can in fact contribute to 
systemic resilience (Holling 1973, 16-17).  Again, an overemphasis on stability within 
equilibrium-centred approaches should in fact be reconsidered and replaced by an 
approach which aimed to increase the resilience of a system through a study of the 
dynamics underlying its domain of attraction.  In his concluding paragraph Holling 
characterized a resilience approach in terms of epistemological modesty, an 
acknowledgment of the limits of human understanding. 
 
A management approach based on resilience…would emphasize the need to keep 
options open, the need to view events in a regional rather than a local context, and 
the need to emphasize heterogeneity.  Flowing from this would be not the 
presumption of sufficient knowledge, but the recognition of our ignorance; not the 
assumption that future events are expected, but that they will be unexpected.  The 
resilience framework can accommodate this shift in perspective, for it does not 
require a precise capacity to predict the future, but only a qualitative capacity to 
devise systems that can absorb and accommodate future events in whatever 
unexpected form they may take (Holling 1973, 21). 
Over the course of his career, Holling would develop and elaborate an approach 
to managing ecosystems composed of multiple, emergent equilibria.  Departing from 
equilibrium-focused techniques focused on systemic stability, a resilience approach, as 
outlined by Holling, would focus on optimizing the conditions for persistence of a 
species or ecosystem.  Enhancing a system’s resilience could be achieved in two ways 
(Holling 1973).  Firstly, one could attempt to move the system further away from a 
critical threshold that would send it towards an alternate attractor.  However, positioning 
a system away from an attractor could come at the cost of systemic efficiency.  
Alternatively, resilience can be enhanced by expanding the stability domain around an 
attractor.  As Gunderson and Holling have noted, this second solution—which seeks to 
engender resilience into a system—not only increases the capacity of a system to 
withstand the impact of potentially destabilizing shocks, but also permits the system to 
quickly and efficiently reorganise so as to capitalize on emerging opportunities (Holling 
et al. 2002, 76).   
Security, within a resilience framework, was no longer a conservative enterprise.  
It was an opportunity to evolve.  Governance, rather than maintaining systems around 
‘natural’ equilibrium points through normative/disciplinary techniques, would be 
reoriented towards enhancing the conditions of a systems capacity for adaptive 
emergence. To appreciate the significance of this new programme for liberal 
governance we should now turn to examine associated developments which were 
occurring simultaneously in the field of Political Economy. 
 
The Nature of Neoliberalism 
 
A year after Holling’s groundbreaking paper, Friedrich von Hayek was awarded the 
1974 Nobel Prize in economics.  In his acceptance speech, subsequently published 
under the title The Pretence of Knowledge (Hayek 1989), Hayek railed against the 
hubris of Keynesian ‘scientistism’ in the context of the ongoing international stagflation 
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crisis.  Echoing Holling, Hayek charged economists with committing the ‘scientistic 
error’ of naively appropriating the mathematically rigorous models of the physical 
sciences without sufficient regard to the differences between the fields.  The market, 
Hayek maintained citing prominent cyberneticist Warren Weaver to lend credibility to 
his assertion, displayed an ‘essential complexity’ which precluded mathematical 
modelling.  Despite his earlier criticism of “slavish imitation of the method and 
language of science" (Hayek 1952, 15) by economists, Hayek would increasingly draw 
upon the discourses of complexity to articulate his understanding of the market and 
promote a form of neoliberal economic governance sensitive to the powerful self-
organizing capacities of the market (Cooper & Walker 2011; Mirowski 1997; Mirowski 
2007).  Consistent with classical liberalism, Hayek interpreted the ‘natural’ status of the 
market to confer limits on the degree to which government could regulate and control its 
processes.  Where Hayek’s project increasingly diverged from classical articulations of 
liberalism over the course of his career was on the nature of the ‘natural’ itself. 
Hayek singled out in his Nobel Prize speech the Club of Rome’s report on The 
Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972) as demonstrative of the status afforded to 
dubious science which transgressed the limits of what it could rightfully determine 
(Hayek 1989, 6).  The report had received significant attention in light of its provocative 
thesis that the sustainability of exponential economic growth was untenable, with the 
limits to this trajectory likely to be reached within the century.  The MIT research group 
behind the report applied systems analysis to computer models to extrapolate the 
interaction between population growth, industrialization, pollution, food production and 
resource depletion over time.  Altering these variables across a range of possible future 
scenarios the MIT team concluded that the rate of depletion of the finite resources upon 
which industrial economies were based raised significant concerns about the limits to 
economic growth.  Echoing the prescription of Howard Odum, the report suggested that 
“it is possible to alter these growth trends and to establish a condition of ecological and 
economic stability that is sustainable far into the future” (Meadows et al. 1972, 24) if 
economic growth was engineered along sustainable lines within a steady-state economy 
which respected ecological and biotic equilibria. 
For Hayek, in such a complex field as the market, that which is important for 
study is rarely quantifiable.  Yet, the scientific status afforded prima facie to 
quantitative studies had encouraged analysis of those factors which can be measured, 
regardless of their overall importance to the dynamics of the market.  Even the positive 
correlation between aggregate demand and total employment may only be approximate, 
Hayek suggested.  However, insofar as it is the only cause for which we have 
quantitative data it has been taken as a scientific truth despite the fact that it may only 
be partial explanation of more complex processes.  What may, in fact, contribute more 
substantially to unemployment—namely, discrepancies between distribution of demand 
for goods and services and the allocation of labour and other resources mandated for 
production—cannot be demonstrated in relation to quantitative evidence and, as a result, 
had been ignored by policy-makers. 
Just as policies of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) had eroded the resilience 
of complex ecosystems over time, Hayek purported that Keynesian demand-
management approaches have had a debilitating effect on the ability of the underlying 
economic system to adjust to misallocations in labour and capital—the real cause of 
high unemployment, according to Hayek.  By pumping money into sectors of the 
economy which only yield temporary demand, policies of Keynesian demand-
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management only delay necessary structural adjustment and breed dependency on a 
continual flow of state-finance—both of which only serve to increase inflation.  What 
was required was instead a qualitative approach focused on optimizing the conditions 
for self-organization, adaptability and growth.  Hayek would characterize this approach 
as environmental:  
“if man is to do more harm than good in his efforts to improve social order, he 
will have to learn that in this and in other fields where essential complexity of an 
organized kind prevails, he cannot acquire full knowledge which would make 
mastery of the events possible.  He will therefore have to use what knowledge he 
can achieve, not to shape the results as the craftsman shapes his handiwork, but 
rather to cultivate growth by providing the appropriate environment, in the 
manner in which the gardener does this for his plants” (Hayek 1989, 7).  
Environmental governance would invoke the nature of the market, in classical 
liberal fashion, to discourage interventionist state policies which might interfere with 
inherent processes of self-organization.  However, in conceptualizing the market in 
terms of an open, complex adaptive system (see Mirowski 2002) Hayek would draw 
upon a fundamentally different understanding of nature than that which had been 
classically conceived in both the fields of Political Economy and Ecology.  For Hayek, 
the complexity of the market required a displacement of government efforts from 
intervening upon the processes of the economy itself to optimizing the conditions for 
self-organization and adaptive evolution.  As an open, complex system the economy 
evolved most effectively in far from equilibrium conditions and productively when 
liberated from the stagnating control of the interventionist state.  As open systems, local 
economies, rather than being shielded from the wider economic environment through 
state finance, would need to be opened to it, in order to allow processes of adaptation 
and co-evolution to operate.  Scholarship, in turn, would need to be conducted with 
requisite epistemological modesty, identifying the qualitative conditions in which the 
self-organization of the market is optimized.  
In The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault would recognize the singularity of the 
‘environmental technology’ operationalised within a neoliberal governmentality 
(Foucault 2008, 259).  These techniques, he would stress, were not the equilibrium-
based mechanisms of disciplinary society based on a “standardizing, identificatory, 
hierarchical individualization” (Foucault 2008, 261).  Rather, this is the 
“image, idea, or theme-program of a society in which there is an optimization of 
systems of difference, in which the field is left open to fluctuating processes, in 
which minority individuals and practices are tolerated, in which action is brought 
to bear on the rules of the game rather than on the players, and finally in which 
there is an environmental type of intervention instead of the internal subjugation 
of individuals” (Foucault 2008, 259-60). 
The advent of environmental technologies coincided with the “massive withdrawal [of] 
the normative-disciplinary system” (Foucault 2008, 260). This is not a programme of 
standardization utilizing disciplinary technologies to structure the mentality of 
individuals in accordance with an ideal normality.  Nor is it a programme of biopolitical 
regulation operating on the ‘generality’ of aleatory events which, though unpredictable 
in their individual occurrence, display a constancy at the mass-level of the population in 
relation to which regulatory mechanisms could be introduced to “to establish an 
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equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a homeostasis, and compensate for 
variations within this general population and its aleatory field” (Foucault 2003, 246).  
The idea of fixed norms and ‘natural’ equilibria, at the level of the individual and the 
population, are dispensed with entirely for an “environmentalism open to unknowns and 
transversal phenomena” (Foucault 2008, 261).  Foucault’s lecture notes conclude with a 
provocative question: “But does this mean that we are dealing with natural subjects? 
[end of manuscript]” (Foucault 2008, 261).   
If environmental technologies operated in relation to a ‘natural’ subject this was 
not to suggest either that they proceeded from a more objective rendering of the political 
subject or that they are involved with emancipating the subject from processes of 
political subjectification.   Rather, it was because human populations were now 
understood within the same ‘natural’ figure of the environment—characterized by non-
linear emergent self-organization. This re-conceptualization would have implications 
for liberal governance. Ensuring the subject is capable of co-evolution with their 
environment cannot be achieved by structuring the mentality of the subject.  Rather 
governance would be directed towards acting on the subject’s environment: understood 
as an incentive structure and thus a condition of possibility for emergent norms and 
behaviours.  Security could thus no longer attempt to protect the subject from threat if 
this meant closing them off from their milieu.  Instead, security would have to proceed 
by exposing the subject more fully to their environment so as to optimise its 
governmental effects in encouraging innovation and, crucially, adaptation. 
 
The Birth of Resilient Populations 
 
We have now established how the discursive framework advanced within the 
complexity sciences coupled with the environmental techniques of governance 
associated with neoliberalism comprised a novel apparatus of power/knowledge.  We 
may now account for the appearance of resilient populations as an effect of these 
transformations.  Following Foucault, it is imperative to recognize how an order of 
power/knowledge ‘marks out in reality that which does not exist and legitimately 
submits it to the division between true and false’ (Foucault 2008, 19).  Priority is placed 
on the constitutive effect of practices in determining the objects of social science.  
Resilient populations as such must be regarded as a particular enframing of life which 
arose as the correlate to neoliberal governance.  As an object constituted through the 
exercise of specific practices of governance, resilient populations cannot be said to 
properly ‘exist’ ontologically.  Nor could they be discovered.  They must instead be 
understood as the product of more obscure ontopolitical processes.  This requires a shift 
in perspective—one which denies the existence of a fundamental logic underlying the 
‘being’ of resilient populations, and instead attunes itself to the politics constitutive of 
resilient populations as a referent of governance.  Resilient populations are simply the 
correlate of practices of governance; an interpretation of social behaviour determined 
by, and supportive of, neoliberalism. 
These thoroughly political processes of objectification are what this chapter has 
sought to begin fleshing out.  Given the immensity of the task, it would be impossible to 
exhaustively account for these processes here.  Instead this final section will investigate 
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critical changes to the definition of panic which facilitated the appearance of ‘resilient 
populations. 
From the 1950s, substantial American military funding was being provided to 
researchers at The University of Chicago, the University of Maryland and the 
University of Oklahoma to investigate population behavior in civilian emergencies.2  
The military was interested in extrapolating the conclusions of these studies to 
understand how civilians react to crisis both to inform the design of domestic social 
controls and direct offensive strategies (Quarantelli 1987; Quarantelli 1990; Quarantelli 
2004).  The empirical research collected corroborated the evidence of earlier studies, 
including those of Mintz and Strauss, which had argued that the behaviour of 
populations in emergency was better characterized as rational action, rather than 
irrational hysteria, based on an individual’s perception of their situation (see Mintz 
1951; Strauss 1953).  This proposition was assisted by E.L. Quarantelli’s popular 
redefinition of panic as “actual (or attempted) physical flight” (Quarantelli 1957, 188) 
which, though more empirically verifiable, was quite obviously a radical departure from 
an understanding of panic in terms of irrational social hysteria.  Panic, Quarantelli 
concluded, is ‘a relatively uncommon phenomenon’ which is ‘over-exaggerated’ in 
disaster literature (Quarantelli 1954, 275).  To the extent that it does manifest,  
panic flight does not involve irrational thought if by that is meant anything in the 
way of faulty deductions from certain premises. From the position of an outside 
observer this may appear to be the case but, from a participant's viewpoint, given 
his limited perspective of only certain portions of the total situation, no such 
interpretation or irrationality can be made. For the fleeing of person, his action 
appears to him quite appropriate to the situation as he perceives it at that time 
(Quarantelli 1954, 272). 
Significantly, Quarantelli warns that “[o]ne of the most important contributory 
conditions [to the onset of panic] is the existence of a social or group predefinition of a 
crisis as one that is likely to eventuate in panic flight” (Quarantelli 1954, 275).  
While reminiscent of earlier studies which had investigating panic as a 
contagion, (Orr 2006; Pelling 2001; Forth 2001) Quarantelli’s conception of panic 
displayed an important qualification.  Panic’s transmission mechanism would no longer 
be perceived in energetic terms as a contagious affect which by exciting the body served 
to undermine rationality, and by extension sociality, but in terms of an adaptive, rational 
response to information within a situation of perceived entrapment.  This shift in the 
understanding of panic aligned with a broader trend in sociological research of the late 
1950s in which notions of ‘suggestibility’ and ‘contagion’ were displaced by an 
emphasis on emergent norms and adaptive tendencies as explanations of collective 
behavior (Orr 2006, 128-134).  This shift was indicative of the creeping influence of 
cybernetics and information theory within American sociology which would come to 
understand the maintenance of a stable social order as a function of information 
exchange. 
Jackie Orr identified that by the 1970s sociological studies of panic appeared far 
less frequently and were being displaced by mounting psychological research on ‘panic 
disorder’: a condition characterised by recurrent panic attacks (a sudden, uncontrollable 
                                                          
2Detailed histories of this field of research are now provided by a number of sources (see Dynes & 
Drabek 1994; Quarantelli 1987; Quarantelli 1990; Quarantelli 1994; Quarantelli 2004) 
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onset of intense fear often accompanied by hyperventilation, perspiration, nausea, 
dizziness and heart palpitations) triggered by no observable cause (Orr 2006, 172-175).  
Assisted by Quarantelli’s rigorous, but ultimately far narrower, definition of panic in 
terms of flight, the very idea of panic was itself being transformed alongside the general 
trend towards cybernetic thinking taking place within American sociology.  No longer 
understood in terms of irrational hysteria, panic was now taken to be an adaptive 
response exhibited by a minority of individuals within a position of perceived 
entrapment.  Combating this behavior required opening communication channels and 
assisting participants by providing them with information upon which to base their 
decisions. 
Despite the mounting literature of disaster research, it was only at the turn of the 
twenty-first century that Disaster Research would affect a significant reorganization of 
emergency planning and response in Britain.  True, the end of the Cold War provided an 
opportunity, giving impetus to a radical rethink of UK Civil Contingencies in light of 
the widespread acknowledgement that Civil Defence was poorly suited to the ‘complex 
emergencies’ and ‘new security challenges’ of the 21st century (Smith 2003, 414).  But, 
this reorganization of UK Civil Contingencies also indicates an important event which 
is much more difficult to pinpoint—the passing of panic below a particular threshold of 
truth and the validation of ‘resilient populations’ as a referent object of emergency 
governance.  What we can however begin to identify are the conditions within which 
such determinations could not be recognized as valid. 
 
Conclusion 
   
 The resilience of populations in emergencies is often portrayed as the discovery 
of a natural phenomenon by disaster researchers.  This chapter offers an alternative 
explanation with the aim of upsetting the predominance of this narrative.  Resilient 
populations, I suggest, are not a socio-historical constant whose essence can be 
objectively determined and communicated by science.  The appearance of resilient 
populations is the result of ontopolitical processes, rather than an objectively ontological 
discovery.  
This chapter has sought to locate the conditions under which resilient 
populations could emerge as a conceptual object and referent of governance.  It locates 
these conditions within transformations occurring in the order of power/knowledge 
supporting liberal governance.  Specifically, this chapter demonstrated how the coupling 
of a novel account of nature produced by the complexity turn within the disciplines of 
Ecology and Economics with ‘environmental’ techniques of government constituted a 
novel apparatus of power/knowledge which underpins contemporary neoliberalism.   
Priority was placed on the constitutive effects of practices in rendering ‘resilient 
populations’ as an empirical object of social science and referent object of governance 
is an effect of neoliberal governance.  As such, the conditions under which resilient 
populations could appear as a conceptual object were located not in the advance of 
(social) science, but in the ascendance of neoliberalism as a regime of governance. 
Given the important role which panic played in enabling the disciplinary and 
biopolitical techniques of emergency governance historically, its current 
13 
 
problematization within resilience discourses must be regarded as a pivotal event in the 
history of emergency governance.  But, of course, the exhaustiveness of this event 
should also not be overstated.  Panic has proved to be a remarkably persistent idea.  
Indeed, the widespread assumption of panic within popular imaginaries of disaster has 
been identified as a recurrent obstacle to the spread of resilience strategies.  Initiatives 
to enhance ‘community resilience’ have thus been accompanied by educational 
campaigns designed to raise public awareness of the fallacy of panic and promote good 
practice with regards to the governance of resilient populations(Challenger et al. 2009).  
In spite of these efforts, the assumption of panic remains widespread with references to 
panic continuing to be found even within UK emergency planning guidance (Drury et 
al. 2013).  The persistence of panic should, I believe, alert us firstly to the fact that 
resilience discourses, while ubiquitous, are far from hegemonic.  Panic is not simply a 
relic of the past, but something which continues to be manifest to the extent that 
disciplinary and biopolitical forms of government persist within the social field.  The 
colonisation of this space itself represents a condition of possibility for the continued 
evolution and spread of resilience discourses. 
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